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Abstract 
Identity formation is probably one of the most discussed aspects of strategic 
positioning within anthropology, sociology and political science. In general notions 
of identity have been based on either an absolutist or primordial understanding of 
belonging or a constructionalist view in which social and political positioning in 
terms of identity formation are governed by a given societal context. This paper 
bases its understanding of identity formation on the latter approach. This means 
that depending of context individuals have several different although related 
identities to choose between when manoeuvring in a complex and dynamic social 
environment.  Identity formation, achieved or ascribed, and its various forms of 
externalisation are thus negotiated and not absolute. The dynamic behind this 
notion of identity formation is individual agency strategically manipulating social, 
economic and political positioning in a given societal setup. To illustrate the 
complexities and in this case negative ramifications of social engineering the article 
focuses on inter-ethnic relations and industrial development in Penang, Malaysia. 
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Introduction 
The ethnic composition between the three main ethnic groups in Malaysia, the 
Malays, the Chinese and the Indians, can in 2006 be delineated as followers1
 
: 
Malaysia Penang State 
Malays 56 % 40 % 
Chinese 31 % 43 % 
Indian 7 % 10 % 
Others (including Orang Asli) 6 % 7 % 
 
Since the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971 this inter-ethnic 
setup has since 1971 been locked in a negative triangulation. A driving force 
behind this can be defined as a positive discrimination of the Malays in comparison 
to the other two ethnic groups. This has resulted in a hardening of ethnic borders 
thus making social mobility across ethnic boundaries rather difficult. Processes of 
identity formation are therefore closely following ethnic borders. Due to this state of 
affairs the most wealthy and best educated ethnic group, the Chinese, are not 
getting the most attractive jobs within neither the top echelons of the state 
bureaucracy nor in academia thus leaving Malaysia altogether for better job 
opportunities abroad. The same goes for young Chinese graduates who aspire to 
pursue a university degree. In both cases Malays are getting the most attractive 
jobs and most of the government grant for taking up studies at the universities. 
Because of their ethnically determined positioning at the bottom of the society the 
majority of Indians are facing tremendous problems moving up the social system, 
                                                 
1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penang 
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as they have neither the wealth nor education to do that. In other words all three 
ethnic groups are locked in their respective ethnically defined cages. 
 
The main consequences of this negative ethnic triangulation are that the most 
important jobs within the state bureaucracy are not necessarily manned by the best 
educated, and the students at the universities are not necessarily the best qualified 
due to the politically designed preferential treatment of the Malay. Perhaps the 
most serious consequence of this is that it has denied Malaysia the freedom of 
manoeuvre as a nation. This is so much more problematic as Malaysia is facing a 
serious economic problem now that the current global economy is contracting due 
to the financial and economic crisis. For Penang in particular this has meant that 
the main economic players, the multinational companies (MNCs), in the high-tech 
sectors of the industrial setup have threatened to move to other countries, for 
example, Vietnam, that can offer lower production cost than Penang. This means 
that if Penang is to uphold its position as a regional high-tech hub then it has to 
move up the value chain by making the 250 plus MNCs in the high-tech business 
move their R&D departments to Penang. The possibility for doing so is there due to 
a highly developed industrial infrastructure and an investor friendly government, 
but the problem is, however, that a complex state bureaucracy is taking a heavy 
toll on an effective handling of business matters. The same goes for the production 
of university graduates for the R&D heavy high-tech and bio-tech industries. Put 
together these two main factors seem make the MNCs reconsider their position in 
Penang. As indicated above one of the main reasons behind these serious 
problems are the politically designed preferential treatments of Malays thus 
choosing ethnic belonging over the best qualified individuals regardless of ethnic 
background. Even though the political establishment has maintained several times 
that the preferential treatment of the Malays is to be phased out and all citizens of 
Malaysia regardless of ethnic belonging is to be perceived as Malaysian per se the 
preferential system is still very much in place. The political cost of dismantle it 
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seems to be too high for the Malays. Basically the reluctance of initiating such a 
change jeopardizes the overall strategy of moving Penang up the value chain. The 
frozen ethnic boundaries and thus locked mode of identity formation constitute a 
kind of lid on the economic development in this the fourth largest contributor to the 
national Malaysian GDP. 
 
In the following the article focuses on the ethnic Chinese SMEs within the high-tech 
sector. They are to constitute a counter study towards the general perception of the 
Chinese as an ethnic group that perceives the latter as a coherent, intra-ethnically 
oriented as well as more or less homogeneous group.2 The article takes a global 
economic perspective of the Chinese thus introducing a more complex view 
stressing that the Chinese entrepreneurs are more inter-ethnic rather than intra-
ethnic oriented economic players.3
 
 This way of perceiving the Chinese Malays 
demonstrates that the general perception is based on a politically motivated social 
engineering that is to reinforce an ideationally designed multicultural image of 
Malaysia which basically is to legitimise a perpetuation of the current preferential 
treatment of the Malay majority. 
 
On the Economic set-up in Penang 
When discussing the economic development of Penang one has to distinguish 
between prior and post 1971. In pre-1971 Penang was mainly an agricultural 
economy complemented by government initiated import substitution schemes. This 
was to ensure that the local economy could stay independent and produce enough 
for local consumption. As there were no manufacturing companies and that the 
British owned companies in mainly the trading and plantation sector did not restore 
                                                 
2 Gomez (2002), Gomez and Benton (2004), Boulton (2005), Yeung (1999). 
3 Jacobsen (2006), Yen Ching-Hwang (2002), Tan Chee-Beng (2004), . 
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their operations to the pre-war level after WWII, unemployment was rather high 
during that period. 
 
After 1971 things changed quite rapidly. The southern part of the island became 
highly industrialised and has over the years attracted more than 250 MNC high-
tech electronic plants such as Dell, Intel, AMD, Altera, Motorola, Agilent, Hitachi, 
Osram, Plexus, Bosch, Fairchild and Seagate, most of which are mainly located 
within the Bayan Lepas Free Industrial Zone, which was sat up in 1972. Based on 
the MNCs, Penang has thus concentrated mainly on information and 
communication technology (ICT), semiconductors, computer and computer 
peripherals, data storage devices, telecommunications equipment (software) and 
consumer electronics. To service the MNCs more that 1200 local support 
industries have sprung up within and outside Bayan Lepas. They are mainly 
specialised within automation, plastics, precision engineering and metal work, 
chemical products and packaging of various kinds. 
 
A consequence of these developments has been that today Penang state has the 
fourth-largest economy in Malaysia, after Perak, Selangor and Johor. 
Manufacturing is the most important component of the Penang economy, 
contributing about 43% to the State's GDP.4
                                                 
4 Penang Sustainability 2008. 
 Furthermore, in January 2005 Penang 
was formally accorded Multimedia Super Corridor Cyber City status, the first 
outside of Cyberjaya on the Malaysian peninsula, with the aim of furthering the 
development of high-tech industrial parks that are to conduct cutting-edge ICT 
research. The latest area of research in Penang to be taken up is the 
establishment of a biotech park thus leveraging on its industrial infrastructure that 
has made it Malaysia’s foremost electronic hub. It is the expectation that this will 
poised Penang to take off in the highly promising frontier of biotechnology. This 
new initiative is in line with the 9th Malaysia Plan, which has identified this sector as 
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one of the main areas that is to help drive the country forward towards a developed 
knowledge economy status as required by the Cyber City status. 
 
In recent years, however, the state is experiencing a gradual decline of foreign 
direct investments (FDI) due to factors such as cheaper labour costs in Vietnam, 
China and India, and arguably, lagging human capital in the form of a well 
educated and up-to-date labour force. Furthermore, the entrepôt trade has 
declined due in part to the loss of Penang's free-port status in 1969, but also due to 
the active development of Port Klang near the federal capital Kuala Lumpur. 
However, the container terminal in Butterworth, on the mainland side of Penang 
State, is in for a major upgrade as detailed in the Northern Corridor Economic 
Region developmental plan that were initiated in 2007. The main objective is to 
service the northern Malaysian region but still carter for the rest of Malaysia in 
competition with Port Klang.5
 
 Other important sectors of Penang's economy that is 
to be upgraded according to this plan includes health tourism, which is mainly 
clustered in the northern part of Penang Island as well as in Georgetown, together 
with finance, shipping and a variety of service sectors catering for the industrial 
development. 
Penang State Government’s Economic Policies and the Chinese SME 
Community 
In order to counter the above mentioned industrial decline the previous Penang 
State Government (PSG) under chief minister Tan Sri Dr. Koh Tsu Koon initiated 
an aggressive economic policy. Owing to limited land size and the highly 
industrialised nature of Penang's economy, agriculture is given little emphasis in its 
developmental plans. This comes as no surprise, as agriculture was only 
contributing about 1.3% to the state GDP in 2000 and there is no prospect of it to 
                                                 
5 Lim Wei Seong 2007, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penang. 
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increase substantially in the years to come. The PSG is thus concentrating on 
servicing the industrial setup. 
 
Even though Penang got the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) status in 2005 the 
Penang high-tech industry still faces stiff competition from the original MSC on the 
Malaysia mainland thus threatening its position as Malaysia’s ‘Silicon Valley’. The 
up until March 2008 Chinese dominated Gerakan Party that has led the state 
government since 1969, was well aware of this and took several steps to address 
this threat. According to Peggy Toe, selling Penang was an important element in 
the government’s industry competitive strategies and in line with the economic 
prescriptions promoted by both Vision 2020 and MSC for setting-up a new 
Malaysia. Accordingly, Penang stepped up its plans to become a symbol of this 
new emerging era (Toe 2003: 554). 
 
In 1992, Penang Development Corporation (PDC)6
 
 was asked to develop a road 
map for operationalising the main ideas behind Vision 2020. In drawing on this 
vision PDC developed the theme ‘Penang: Into the 21st Century’ to outline its 
goals. It first aimed at diversify Penang’s economy by creating a local 
manufacturing capability that was high-tech based and competitive driven thereby 
responding to the demands from the various MNCs, and second, to develop a 
sophisticated service sector buttressed by the ‘state-of-the-art’ technology and 
skills, and finally, to modernise and upgrade the dormant productive capabilities in 
the agricultural sectors. 
Besides these initiatives the Penang State Government, strongly supported by the 
private sector, initiated several projects that laid the groundwork for achieving the 
                                                 
6 PDC was inaugurated in November 1969. It still is the main state development agency to help develop, plan, implement 
and promote socio-economic projects on behalf of the state government. It thus functions as the investment arm of the state 
government (http://www.pdc.gov.my/ ). 
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strategies as defined by PDC. For example, two Free Industrial Zones and five 
industrial parks covering 1,850 ha of land on both Penang Island and Port 
Wellersley on mainland Penang were developed. Tax incentive schemes were 
introduced to entice foreign capital. A highly diversified electronics industry and 
supporting industries in engineering, metal, plastics and packaging for the 
electronic/electric industry were courted together with industries in the textiles and 
apparel sectors. 
 
Initially MNCs were attracted to Penang due to its highly qualified labour resource, 
an efficient transport and communication infrastructure and the existence of an 
efficient banking and insurance sector combined with well developed freight and 
forwarding services. Automation was encouraged right from the start in order to 
keep labour costs down. The Penang State Government was quite supportive of 
foreign ventures and proved an important facilitator of business. The Penang State 
was so successful in reinventing itself as a progressive developmental state that 
manufacturing increased from 13% of GDP in 1971 to more than 50% of the GDP 
in 2000, employing more than 40% of the total labour force. In June 2000 there 
were 693 factories in Penang with a paid-up capital exceeding RM 7.3 billion. Of 
these 37.8% of investments came from overseas investors, the largest being 
Taiwan followed by Japan, the US and Singapore (ibid 2003: 554).7 Furthermore, 
besides providing both tax and non-tax incentive packages for both local SME 
industries as well as for MNCs the Penang State Government introduced two new 
economic facilitators to help further develop the industrial setup in Penang, namely 
investPenang and the Socio-Economic and Environmental Research Institute 
(SERI).8
 
 
                                                 
7 Although tourism is the second pillar of growth in Penang this sector will not be discussed in this report due to main topic, 
which focuses on Chinese SME entrepreneurs. For further readings on the tourism sector, see Peggy Teo 2003. 
8 These economic facilitators will be discussed later on in this section. 
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Now, before discussing how the various types of economic facilitators and 
government initiatives have impacted on the Chinese SME business community 
that constitutes a major part of the industrial setup in Penang and is the main focus 
of attention in this article, a definition of what is meant by SME is described. 
Generally, it can be defined into two broad categories9
 
: 
1. Manufacturing, Manufacturing-Related Services and Agro-based industries: 
Small and medium enterprises in the manufacturing, manufacturing related 
services and agro-based industries are enterprises with full-time employees not 
exceeding 150 or with annual sales turnover not exceeding RM25 million. 
 
2. Services, Primary Agriculture and Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT): Small and medium enterprises in the services, primary agriculture and 
Information & Communication Technology (ICT) sectors are enterprises with full-
time employees not exceeding 50 or with annual sales turnover not exceeding 
RM5 million. 
 
Based on these framework definitions a characteristic of the Chinese SME 
community in Penang can be summarised as follows: about 85% of the local 
industry in Penang can be classified as SMEs, the majority of which are owned by 
Chinese. During an interview with representatives from the Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce in the provincial capital Georgetown it was emphasised that the typical 
Chinese SME is currently undergoing a change. They are not only family run 
enterprises but are evolving into more complex and diversified entities, the specific 
characteristics of which depends on the size and constitution of the individual 
company. The micro or ‘Mom and Pap’ Chinese SMEs are typically very small 
                                                 
9 The following is based on definitions provided by ‘Small and Medium Industries Development Corporation’ 
(http://www.smidec.gov.my/index.jsp). For further information of the SME community in Penang, please see Penang 
Economic Monthly. Vol. 9, Issue 4. April 2007. 
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family owned and run companies that produce a rather narrow range of products. 
This is especially the case if they are suppliers to major local or foreign companies. 
The small and medium SMEs constitute a more diversified lot. The most efficient of 
them has hired professional, not necessarily Chinese, managers to run the 
business in an ‘arm’s length’ mode, but maintain the control over the business 
strategies themselves. Interestingly, the development of such strategies is based 
on generally acknowledged Chinese modes of networking. For example, guanxi 
ways of networking constitute an important strategy thus matching the general 
stereotype of Chinese business practices.10
 
 
It is thus possible to divide the Penang Chinese SME community into three main 
categories: 1. a ‘classical’ one consisting of 100% family owned and run SMEs 
(mainly micro SMEs), 2. 100% family owned SMEs that are professionally 
managed according to ‘arm’s length’ principles, but make use of ‘classical’ Chinese 
business strategies and network practices (mainly small and some medium SMEs), 
and 3.  those SMEs that are about 50% or less owned by Chinese entrepreneurs, 
are professionally, that is, not family managed, and combine ‘classical’ Chinese 
strategies and network practices with modern market seeking techniques thus 
pushing them towards the upper level of the SME category and perhaps into the 
category of public listed companies (PLC) thus leaving the SME category all 
together. 
 
There are two main reasons behind this differentiation of the Penang SME 
community. First and foremost, there is an ever entrenching global market 
economy that forces structural as well as organisational changes on the companies 
towards establishing a division of labour between ownership and management and 
to venture outside the immediate domestic market in order to expand their reach. 
The second reason for this differentiation is what can be defined as a negative 
                                                 
10 Cribb (2000), Jacobsen (2007), Tong and Yong (1998). 
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tendency towards re-investment in one’s own company due to what other 
observers have define as a localised mindset that focuses more on profit 
optimisation than technological and managerial upgrading. This goes especially for 
the 100% family owned and run companies. This kind of companies is open 
towards new production avenues that turn them into becoming, for example, 
suppliers to MNCs but this does not move them up the value chain due to the 
before mentioned mindset. What, however, all categories of Chinese SMEs share 
is a kind of openness towards change per se that drives them forward although in 
different directions. This is, according to representatives from the Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce, an inherent aspect within the nature of the Chinese 
business practice, namely openness towards change. 
 
Interestingly, the differences between the three groups of Chinese SMEs are also 
reflected in their respective network practices. For example, the smaller the SME 
the more ethnically based their network practices become. As a company moves 
up the value chain its network practices begin to cross ethnic boundaries and 
branch out into a non-ethnic related business environment. This has a direct 
bearing on the degree of linkages to the global business community. Such linkages 
demand cross-cultural relationships, as market forces do not distinguish between 
race and culture, but rather on whether a company is capable of thriving in a 
competitive environment. In this particular context there is thus a real difference 
between the global and the local. The above described differences within the 
Chinese SME business community constitute what I later on will refer to as a 
variety of fault lines within this community, thus showing that the latter is not a 
homogeneous community but rather a dynamic one in which firms develops, dies 
or don’t do anything but survive and are quite satisfied by doing just that! 
 
Dynamics with the SME community: From SME to PLC and (almost) back 
again: on the impact of the bumiputra policy 
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As discussed above the Chinese SME community in Penang is not a 
homogeneous or static group, - a fact that will be elaborated upon later on in 
greater detail. Not even the top companies of the SME group constitute a static 
upper layer of the SME category. Here medium sized companies move beyond the 
upper limits of the SME category and into the order of public listed companies. The 
demarcating lines between these two categories are thus not absolute! The latter 
type of companies constitutes a kind of role model for those SMEs that aspire to 
move up the value chain. There are some factors, however, that work against the 
full developmental potential of the PLCs, - factors that have their roots back to the 
New Economic Polices (NEP) and the embedded bumiputra policy, both initiated in 
1971. 
 
In an attempt to explain the relationship between NEP’s economic policies and the 
underlying inter-ethnic dimension Khoo Boo Teik writes that without dismissing 
some of NEP’s underlying, more generalised principles about an equitable inter-
ethnic distribution of wealth via affirmative action programmes, he suggests that 
Malaysia’s NEP was never exclusively restricted to ethnicity and ethnic relations. 
NEP encompassed state policies that affected ethnic identities, inter-ethnic power 
sharing and an ethnically targeted distribution of developmental benefits, but was 
not confined to these issues (Khoo 2004: 4). 
 
Khoo concludes that NEP could heighten as well as diminish ethnic differences to 
the extent that issues of ethnic identity and problems of cultural grievances in 
Malaysia had always had an economic essence to them. The substantive 
attainment of NEP’s socioeconomic goals diminished the likelihood of intense 
ethnic economic rivalry, while the Mahathir regime’s economic solutions to cultural 
problems in the 1990s encouraged a deeper sense of national purpose and identity 
(Khoo 2004: 18).  
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However, the ethnic issue still lingers on. Zooming in on the political realm one 
finds several examples of a discourse on more or less tense inter-ethnic relations 
just beneath the surface. For example, during 2006 several complains from the 
Malaysian community in Penang have been voiced of being marginalised in terms 
of political influence due to the fact that the Chinese dominated political party 
Gerakan from the ruling coalition Barisan Nasional has held the position of Chief 
Minister since 1969 and up until March 2008. This critique of not being a multi-
cultural party and thus not contributing towards forwarding Penang’s and ultimately 
Malaysia’s, racial harmony has been denied by the party’s vice-president, Datuk’ 
Teng Hock Nam. He said that such statements are not fair just by looking at the 
racial makeup of its members. Even though about 80 % of Gerakan members are 
Chinese, the party has always adopted a non-racial approach to Malaysian 
politics.11
 
 
Despite indicated otherwise by various observers, racial tensions do exist and 
contemporary Malaysia has still not moved beyond the confines of the bumiputra 
policy. As a consequence conflicting inter-ethnic relations are occasionally 
surfacing, if not constantly simmering just beneath an otherwise tranquil multiracial 
surface. One only needs to read the articles in the Straits Times in late November 
2007 on Malay Chinese, who immigrated to other countries due to better ‘life’ 
conditions there than in Malaysia, as well as the articles on Malay Indian 
demonstrations in November and early December 2007. That the inter-ethnic 
question was still not solved in July 2009 could be seen in an article in The Straits 
Times, where the former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad maintained that non-
Malays are the real masters in Malaysia. Mahathir were cited for saying that the 
bumiputra share of the corporate pie is only 20% while Chinese Malaysians hold 
                                                 
11 The Star. Nov. 13, 2007. 
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50% despite them making up a mere 26% of the population.12
 
 On the basis of 
these simmering sub-societal tensions I will in the following maintain that the 
bumiputra policy, besides demonstrating that it is still in existence, also hampers 
the Chinese SMEs efforts to move up the value chain, thus damaging the 
development of the Malaysian economy per se. 
As stated by representatives from several PLCs during fieldwork in Penang in 2007 
and 2008, due to a federal governmental requirement of 30% Malay equity 
ownership of non-bumiputra owned PLCs, most Chinese company owners have 
chosen to transform their companies into holding companies in stead of creating 
one big local or transnational company. The logic behind this dates back to a 1975 
federal governmental legislation on investment practices, which states that 
Chinese entrepreneurs had to apply for permission to invest more than 2,5 million 
Ringgit (RM) in any type of business. This benchmark is currently (2008-2009) 
being debated and a new benchmark of about 10 million RM is proposed. If a 
Chinese entrepreneur got the permission to invest from the authorities, then 30% 
of this new enterprise is to be handled over to Malays as either shares or 30% 
Malay equity ownership of the business in question. In case a company intended to 
invest more that 2.5 million RM, then they will be scrutinised if the targeted 30% 
bumiputra equity is not met.13
 
 
The political rationale behind this business ownership policy was and still is to in 
enforce Malay participation of Chinese owned companies so as to raise the 
percentage of Malay entrepreneurship in the Malaysian corporate world. The 
downside of this policy has so far been twofold. First, it has created tensions 
between Chinese and Malay entrepreneurs in terms of business ownership due to 
a general notion of that the Malay private investment rate is relatively low and that 
                                                 
12 The Straits Times Wednesday, July 22, 2009. See also The Straits Times 21 April 2008. 
13 For a critical discussion of this remnant from the NEP, see www.atimes.com 11 April 2008 and again on 23 January 2009. 
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suitable Malay partners are difficult to come by. Second, Chinese entrepreneurs 
have, when contemplating listing                                                      their companies 
on the stock exchange, formed holding companies instead, which consist of 
numerous specialised subsidiaries that functions as each other’s supplier. In this 
way their companies are bypassing federal governmental regulations on 
investment practices and thereby maintaining full control over their companies. 
 
Several major Chinese owned SMEs and PLCs do, however, have Malays on their 
board of directors. This they have chosen to have due to investment plans thus 
tapping into the political advantages that such a partnership might entail. To have 
or not have Malays on the board of directors thus depends on a given business 
strategy! The main rationale behind such strategies is thus based on how to control 
company assets and to implement investment plans. 
 
SMEs/PLCs and the Impact of the Governmental Economic Facilitators (PDC, 
investPenang and SERI) 
The Chinese SME community does not exist in a vacuum but relates to and 
depends on a variety of external institutions for their technological and managerial 
development and ultimately their economic survival. In this section I focus on 
investPenang as a representative of a governmental initiated economic facilitator. 
Other governmental facilitators such as Penang Development Corporation (PDC) 
and SERI will only slightly be touched upon, as data collection in relation to these 
two institutions is still in progress. When discussing these facilitators with the 
Chinese SME community the latter feels being left out of the Penang State 
Government’s economic polices, as it is putting a rather heavy emphasis on the 
high-tech sectors in which a majority of the Chinese SMEs are not engaged in or 
do not have the capacity to do so. There is a feeling that the government is 
especially catering for the major SMEs and PLCs, as they are in a better position to 
16 Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2009 - 30 
attract FDI so that the government can fund and thus further its own economic 
development scheme(s). Those SMEs that are not within the high-tech sector thus 
loose out and have to more or less fend for themselves. This has over time the 
potential of creating negative economic fault-lines within the SME community, as 
only a minor part of the SMEs and PLCs are capable of upgrading and 
subsequently expand into this specialised field. 
 
From the perspective of the Penang State Government this scenario is not the 
case. The state has initiated a SME bank so as to support and further the 
economic development of all sections of the SME community. It has furthermore 
introduced various governmental institutions such as PDC, investPenang and SERI 
so as to help the SMEs to grow and prosper.14
 
 Focusing on, for example, 
investPenang, its main centre of attention is to sustain, rejuvenate and promote the 
business environment in Penang through encouraging to continued investments in 
especially the high-tech sector. investPenang envisions itself as the main driver of 
a three-pronged strategy that is based on combining technological development, 
industrial infrastructure and private business so as to attain a sustainable economic 
growth and development for Penang and Malaysia in general. 
In relation to the SME community in general, investPenang recognises that SMEs 
are very important for the economic development of Penang, as they constitute 
about 90% of the industrial setup. The SMEs, however, are not, according to 
investPenang, that easy to work with due a particular mindset that dominates many 
of the SMEs. First of all, several of them are content by maintaining the size they 
have achieved by now. They generally have a negative attitude towards reinvesting 
their surplus capital in their businesses thus pushing them up the value chain. 
Instead, they concentrate on profit maximisation that results in a seemingly 
                                                 
14 With regard to SERI this is a research institution that is mainly used by the Penang State Government and as such is of no 
direct help to the SME community. It does, however, provide the government with input of the developments within this part 
of the industrial setup (http://www.seri.com.my/index.php ). 
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contradictory planning, namely exhibiting rather high saving rates of about 30% to 
40%, and at the same time wanting to show off their wealth and therefore not 
necessarily reinvest the profit they have generated in new technology and/or 
management practices. This has resulted in what has been called a localised 
mindset that works against those developmental initiatives that investPenang are 
suggesting for this particular section of the industrial setup. As a consequence a 
rather negative attitude towards the SME community has developed, as 
investPenang does not see it as its responsibility to nurture the SMEs toward 
higher growth and greater market integration. According to investPenang their 
mission in this connection is only to prepare the ground for the development of 
pertinent SMEs. Basically, the latter must help themselves to develop further!15
 
 
Interestingly, there is a contradiction in what investPenang is saying it is doing and 
what they are supposed to be doing. According to investPenang’s statutes, it is to 
groom the SME and PLC environment in order to prepare them for pushing 
themselves and Penang up the value chain, especially in the high-tech and related 
sectors. This means that these companies will face increasing global competition, 
as the market opens up the higher up one move along the value chain. On the 
basis of this, investPenang seems to be reluctant in helping SMEs to prepare for 
this increasing competition or to go abroad in order to become more competitive 
internationally. Instead, the strategy seems to be on upgrading the SMEs so that 
they can support pertinent PLCs in their respective internationalisation strategies. 
In this sense investPenang follows the theories of Michael Porter, especially that 
section in his ‘Determinants of National Advantages’ that caters for related and 
supporting national industries in order to prepare for global competition.16
 
 
                                                 
15 Personal communication March 2008. 
16 Porter 1990: 33-129. 
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The present author is sceptical towards such an approach, as making a distinction 
between local and/or global in terms of being a company is problematic. Arguably, 
being competitive globally and having a solid position in ones domestic market is 
not a contradiction but a complementary state of being thus reinforcing a 
company’s capabilities to compete in both areas. As it is now it seems as if 
investPenang is tying the SMEs to a specific locality in the hope of developing it 
domestically thus sheltering it from global competition. If this is the case, then it is 
not a productive approach, as it reduces the individual company’s competitive edge 
thus jeopardizing its long term survival. Instead, investPenang must help or at least 
prepare local SMEs to go global, as otherwise they will not be able to withstand 
global competition. The latter is currently penetrating even the most remote 
sections of the domestic market. It seems that this is a weak spot in 
investPenang’s business strategy with regards to the SME community and the 
latter’s position in an increasing globalising industrial development. 
 
SMEs/PLCs and the Non-Governmental Economic Facilitators 
When analysing the impact of the governmental economic facilitators on the 
Penang SME community one is only researching the first tier of economic 
facilitators that are focusing on the SME section of the industrial setup. One also 
has to focus on the so-called non-governmental economic facilitators, as they 
constitute a second tier of institutions that are engaging the SME business 
environment. I have chosen to focus on Penang Skill Development Centre (PSDC), 
the Penang Chinese Chamber of Commerce and a newly established chamber 
called the South-West Penang Chamber of Commerce. By looking at both these 
tiers of economic facilitators one gets a holistic understanding of the forces that 
define the field within which the SMEs are working. 
 
Penang Skill Development Centre (PSDC) 
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PSDC was established in 1989 and is Malaysia’s first industry-led training centre 
located within the free industrial zone Bayan Lepas in the southern part of island 
Penang. While initiated and sponsored by the Penang State Government and 
aided by academia PSDC itself operates as a non-profit organisation that currently 
has a membership of about 146 companies employing more than 100,000 workers. 
Described by a regional magazine as ‘unique in Malaysia’, the PSDC was singled 
out not because it trains shop floor workers as technicians and engineers, but also 
because competing companies are requesting specific courses and services of 
PSDC thus keeping the latter on the cutting edge of Penang industrial 
development.17
 
 
This, according to the centre’s CEO, offers the most cost-effective training for the 
industry while bridging the gap between skills taught in tertiary institutions and 
those required by companies. ‘As a vehicle that seeks to better understand the 
needs of transnational companies by combining and using joint resources, PSDC 
is a model which has worked very well’, says the CEO, as he acknowledges the 
role played by the eight pioneer electrical and electronics firms, which set up 
factories in Penang three decades ago: Intel, AMD, Osram, Hitachi, Clarion, 
Agilent technologies, Robert Bosch and Fairchild Semiconductor. Together with 
other major companies they have enabled the PSDC to develop models, which 
enhance the quality of the work force, upgrading its services towards major 
companies and to initiate a development that transforms local SMEs into global 
suppliers. 
 
Mindful that Penang’s future as a preferred industrial location hinges on the 
Penang State Government’s ability to provide a workforce that can keep pace with 
                                                 
17 For more details on PSDC see http://www.psdc.com.my/page.cfm?name=Profile-History 
 
20 Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2009 - 30 
technological change. The CEO for PSDC stressed that advanced manufacturing 
technology, automation and research and development have to be adopted not 
only by the MNCs but also by the local support industries. PSDC was thus 
conceptualised on the basis that if Penang was to continue keeping established 
and attracting new MNCs, its human capital must constantly be updated so as to 
keep a pace with the latest changes in technology and management. 
 
Finally, PSDC concentrates in particular on the SME’s, as they constitute the 
backbone of the economy as also stated by investPenang, the public initiated 
economic facilitator. Furthermore, PSDC is also catering for the MNC community 
so as to further develop and create a conducive business environment for them in 
Penang. As a matter of fact, PSDC aims at establishing connections between the 
SMEs and the MNCs in order to create a productive synergy between them. The 
relationship between the two, however, has changed over the last couple of years. 
Previously the MNCs employed pertinent SMEs as suppliers when entering the 
Penang market. Now this relationship has changed towards a more competitive 
one. Today the relationship between the two can be characterised as one based 
on co-opetition, which indicates that each SME and pertinent MNC relate to each 
other on a competitive but also collaborative basis. This is the reality that also the 
Chambers of Commerce has to take into account. Now, let us first take a look at 
the small South-West Penang Chamber of Commerce18
 
 and after that the biggest 
of them all, namely the Penang Chinese Chamber of Commerce. 
South-West Penang Chamber of Commerce 
 
This Chamber focuses mainly on micro and small SMEs within trade, service and 
manufacturing. Regional wise it concentrates its efforts on the south-western 
                                                 
18 This chamber of commerce was previously called Bayan Baru Chamber of Commerce. 
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district of Penang, that is, around the industrial zone Bayan Lepas. It is a 
multicultural Chamber that does not distinguish between the ethnic backgrounds of 
its members. This does not mean, however, that it does not communicate and work 
together with the three ethnic distinct Chambers, that is, the Chinese, Malay and 
Indian Chambers of Commerce. 
 
South-West Penang Chamber of Commerce’s main role is to help SMEs to 
develop. This they do partly through their contacts in the governmental sponsored 
SME Bank, and partly by forcing the SMEs to comply with the official rules and 
regulations, which are imperative if they want to obtain loans from the SME Bank. 
As such, this is a mode of formalising an otherwise more or less informal sector of 
the economy. Their aim is to make these SMEs more efficiently managed and thus 
more competitive in a dynamic market. In case they do not adjust to these 
changing conditions then eventually they will be out-competed by more 
consolidated and developed companies, both local and transnational. 
 
Here the representatives from the Chamber pointed towards the biggest problem 
currently facing the SMEs community, a problem that investPenang also pointed 
towards, namely the mindset that governs the majority of the SMEs. Most of them 
are family owned and managed, which in many cases result in that there is a 
greater incentive for showing off personal success rather than reinvesting profits in 
new technology, know-how and management systems. 
 
This problem, however, depends, according to the Chamber, on the size of the 
individual SME. The further down in size one goes, for example, a micro (‘mom-
and-pop’) SME consisting of one family only with an annual turnover of less than 
250,000 Ringgit, the more conservative in terms of management and technological 
innovation they become. These kinds of SMEs can generally be found at the 
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bottom of the SME business hierarchy so to speak, whereas PLCs such as 
Pentamaster19 and LKT20 with their 550 and 166 employees respectively and an 
annual turnover of more than 115 and 83 million Ringgit respectively, represent 
companies which originally have their roots in the SME community but have move 
beyond this category of companies.21
 
 
This divide points towards a growing fault-line within the SME community. 
Furthermore, this potentially negative development has also a bearing on network 
practices among the SMEs, as that too contributes to further a budding division 
within the Penang SME community. The smaller the SME the more ethnically 
dominated their network practices become. As the SMEs move up the value chain 
their network practices begin to cross ethnic borders and branch out into a non-
ethnic related business environment. It is exactly here that various degrees of 
linkages to the global business community can be observed. The problem for the 
smaller SMEs is, as mentioned above, that the global market is beginning to 
manifest itself even in the tiniest market place. This is something that South-West 
Penang Chamber of Commerce is very much aware of, which is also why they 
constantly urge the smaller companies to mould their mode of doing business 
along the lines of more professionally run and managed companies. In case they 
do not do that they will face problems getting loans in the government controlled 
SME bank. Promoting this alternative business strategy towards the more 
traditionally oriented SME community is also, however, where the Chamber is 
confronted with the greatest resistance towards changes in business practices. 
 
As also noted by investPenang many SMEs are not interested in upgrading their 
management system or the work force due to traditional modes of ownership and 
profit maximisation. What is basically at stake here is a change of company 
                                                 
19 Pentamaster web page: http://www.pentamaster.com.my/subsidiaries.htm  
20 LKT web page: http://www.lkt.com.my/index5.html  
21 Penang Automation Cluster Directory 2007. 
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structure, from a family run company towards an arms-length governed company, 
where an otherwise very close relationship between management and investors 
and thus ownership and control of the company is broken up and professionalised. 
This is seen, according to the South-West Penang Chamber, by the Chinese 
owned companies as a threat towards the very existence of their family run 
businesses, which for a long time constituted and to a certain extend still constitute 
the backbone of the industrial setup in Penang. For these entrepreneurs their 
history and thus legitimacy is at stake here. 
 
When discussing the ethnic representativeness in the multi-ethnic Penang SME 
community the Chamber representatives emphasised that they were a truly multi-
cultural Chamber compared to the other Chambers of Commerce in Penang. 
However, the Chinese companies were in a majority in the South-West Penang 
Chamber, but the contingent of Indian and Malaysian companies is sufficient to 
define it as multicultural. The Chamber was of the opinion that setting up this kind 
of Chambers was the only way forward if Malaysia was to develop into one 
coherent nation. In this way the Chamber is critical towards the positive 
discrimination towards the Malays. However, they also recognised that the three 
other Chambers, the Chinese, the Malay and the Indian one, had for decades been 
divided along ethnic lines and this was something that was very difficult to change, 
- both in terms of tradition but also due to the continuing impact of the bumiputra 
policy on business. 
 
The South-West Penang Chamber of Commerce does have some working 
relations with the other Chambers of Commerce as well as with Penang Skills 
Development Centre (PSDC), as especially the latter represents a way of 
upgrading the various SMEs, that is, those of them that are prepared to do so. 
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The Penang Chinese Chamber of Commerce 
 
According to representatives from this Chamber it does not have that many 
relations to the other three Chambers, the Malaysian, the Indian and the multi-
ethnic South-West Penang Chambers of commerce. The Chinese Chamber called 
itself a ‘one point Chamber’ meaning that all what its members had to do when 
experiencing problems was to contact the Chamber, whereas the latter would take 
care of the problems whatever they might be. 
 
The Chinese Chamber has about 75% of all SMEs in Penang as members; the 
Malaysian Chamber has about 20% and the Indian Chamber about 2%, a division 
that to some extend reflects the ethnic division of Penang’s business community. 
The Chinese Chamber is fully privately sponsored and is run on the basis of 
member fees, whereas the Malaysian Chamber is linked to the Penang State 
Government and is, according to informants, partly sponsored by the latter. 
Informants from the Chinese Chamber of Commerce said that they did not know 
the multi-ethnic South-West Penang Chamber of Commerce.22
 
 They maintained 
that the current three ethnic distinct Chambers were enough to cater for the SME 
community in Penang. 
The Chinese Chamber was servicing various kinds of industries ranging from trade 
over manufacturing to high-tech companies. The main membership criteria are that 
they have to have at least 51% Chinese ownership of the individual company. They 
serviced all sizes of SMEs, from micro over small to medium. They maintained that 
they still had good contact with those SMEs that had become PLCs. This was, 
however, contested by the PLC Pentamaster that maintained it did not have much 
to do with the Chinese Chamber mainly because the two were working in different 
                                                 
22 Nonetheless, I was attending a meeting at the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in 2007, where the South-West Penang 
Chamber of Commerce presented its platform and asked for ways to collaborate. 
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sectors of the economy. Interestingly, Pentamaster was used by the Chinese 
Chamber as a role model for how SMEs could grow if they invested in new 
technology and adopted more advanced management systems instead of holding 
on to traditional Chinese modes of doing business, which, as mentioned above, 
was mainly based on high saving rates and profit maximisation. 
 
According to the Chinese Chamber the Penang Chinese SME community that can 
be divided into three main parts: a ‘classical’ one consisting of 100% family owned 
and run SMEs (mainly micro SMEs), 100% owned family SMEs that is 
professionally managed but make use of ‘classical’ Chinese business strategies 
and network practices (mainly small and some medium SMEs), and finally those 
SMEs that are about 50% owned, professional managed and combine ‘classical’ 
Chinese business strategies and network practices and modern market seeking 
techniques thus pushing them toward the limit within the SME category and further 
on towards PLC status. 
 
There are two main reasons behind the above noted differentiation of the Penang 
SME community. First and foremost there is an entrenching global capitalism that 
forces such a change on those companies who ventures outside the immediate 
local market. The second force of change is an inward looking drive behind a 100% 
family owned and managed company. There are thus various kinds of pressure 
towards change that drives the different SMEs into the different slots mentioned 
above. These changing developments amongst the Chinese SMEs were 
interpreted by representatives from the Chinese Chamber as an inherent aspect of 
Chinese entrepreneurship, namely openness towards change. That might be so 
but also societal factors such as local and national political and social aspects have 
a huge impact on how the Chinese entrepreneurs operate in the market place.23
                                                 
23 For details, see Wee, Jacobsen and Tiong Chong Wong (2006). 
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Currently there seems to be developing a fault-line within the Penang industrial set-
up, a fault-line that manifest itself in increasing non-cooperation and linkages 
between SMEs and PLCs, and between them and the government initiated and 
non-government initiated economic facilitators. This development is driven by an 
ever entrenching global economy that penetrates both national and local 
economies indirectly. Before going into detail with this, a final aspect needs to be 
included, namely one that briefly discusses the impact of Vision 2020 and the 
development of the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC), a subject that is important to 
take into account due to the fact that Penang has be declared the second stage in 
the MSC! 
 
The SME/PLC community and Vision 2020, MSC and NCER 
According to a top state executive councillor Vision 2020 and the MSC was and 
still is a kind of wish thinking. As such the Penang State Government accepts it. 
However, the vision is gradually loosing it attractiveness, as a split between 
ideology and reality begins to emerge. As previously mentioned there are many 
tensions in Malaysia in terms of ethnic and religious cleavages that hinder a 
realisation of the vision. When relating Vision 2020 and MSC to the industrial 
sector, and in particular to the SME community, the latter is becoming more 
sceptical towards it, and is beginning to term it (political) ‘hot air’, meaning that both 
the vision and the MSC is more rhetoric than action, implementation and 
development. The main problem for the industrial sector, and especially for the 
biggest SMEs, PLCs and MNCs, is human resources. This is a problem that, 
according to the state executive councillor, is not taken probably care of by the 
political establishment in terms of fund, education and training facilities. The quality 
of the current level of labour power is not high enough compared to international 
standards. This has a negative impact on industrial performance, as the different 
industries, representing both local as well as transnational companies in the 
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Penang industrial setup, are loosing their competitive edge in the global 
competition. 
 
When asked whether 2020 and MSC fit into the state economic planning schedule 
the state executive councillor said that there was no deliberate attempts of 
incorporating the two. Penang is dominated by low end manufacturing high-tech 
industries and cannot as such move up the value chain just by incorporating the 
two. There are simply not enough skilled labours to do that. In order to move up the 
value chain in a more concrete manner, pertinent and realistic R&D initiatives are 
needed, not visions! As already mentioned there is a great lack within the area of 
human resources. This is currently being sought solved by simultaneously 
importing technicians from abroad and by upgrading PSDC, which plays a key role 
in this connection. Unfortunately, Universiti Sains Malaysia in Penang is currently 
not capable of contributing effectively towards solving this problem due to a lack of 
qualified staff and funding. Finally, further but perhaps more indirectly aggravating 
this situation is the increasing competition from China and India as well as 
competition from other ASEAN countries such as Thailand, The Philippines, 
Indonesia and not the least Vietnam, as they attract both low level manufacturing 
and high-tech MNCs. This is why more R&D and a continuing upgrading of human 
resources are urgently needed in Penang if it is to maintain and further develop its 
position as a high-tech hub. 
 
Some of the things that the Penang State Government can do to leverage this 
situation is to re-orientate the current dominant position of the low end 
manufacturing sector towards more focus on R&D, upgrading PDC, investPenang 
and PSDC’s role as industrial facilitators as well as adding further financial means 
to the tertiary institutions in order to make them work more closely with the 
industrial sectors. Furthermore, the Penang State Government should through 
SERI take a more serious approach towards the SME community by upgrading 
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and integrating it into an overall industrial master plan so as to create a more 
holistic industrial policy for Penang per se. Finally, the state government should, as 
an economic facilitator par excellence, focus even more on upgrading the physical 
infrastructure and stage more aggressive international investment promotion tours 
so as to make more foreign companies and investors aware of the possibilities in 
Penang thus encouraging them to establish themselves in the pertinent industrial 
sectors. All these initiatives, however, will not bear fruit if the current bumiputra 
policy is not gradually dismantled or abolished all together. Equal opportunities for 
all the three main ethnic groups in Penang and in Malaysia in general are a sine 
qua non if the industrial setup is to move up the value chain as mentioned earlier 
on in this article. Interestingly, this seems to be recognised by the federal 
government according to newspaper articles in the New Straits Times on 3 August 
2009. Here Prime Minister Najib Razak is quoted as saying that the bumiputra 
equity shareholding since the inception of the NEP in 1971 seems to be stuck at 
18% or 19% here in 2009. He continues: ‘It is madness if we continue with these 
policies (bumiputra policies (MJ)) even after they had failed for up to 19 years’ 
(NST Aug. 3, 2009). The important question is, however, whether such a policy 
change is also implemented. 
 
Now, let us change the perspective, how do, for example, the Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce, Pentamaster, LKT and the SME community in general relate to Vision 
2020, the MSC and NCER? The Chinese Chamber of Commerce does not see 
major benefits coming out of the Northern Corridor Economic Region (NCER) 
initiatives, as the latter focuses mostly on agricultural developments, logistics and 
on so-called medically related recreational tourism. In relation to the question of 
sub-contracting the Chamber is of the opinion that most of it would probably go to 
Malay companies, as they had the best governmental contacts! What, according to 
the Chamber, their members could expect of the NCER would mostly be small 
contracts that unfortunately might not have a great impact on the SME community 
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as a whole. In relation to Vision 2020 and SMC this was also of little interests for 
the Chinese Chamber, as its members would not be able to draw any benefits out 
of it due to different industrial specialisation. Furthermore, the localised and thus 
parochial focus that permeates many SMEs does not fit into these two dynamic 
developmental schemes thereby nurturing a budding fault-line between them and 
the SME environment. 
 
In relation to Vision 2020 and the MSC a representative from Pentamaster said 
that it was a good vision but poorly implemented. This has something to do with the 
ability of bureaucrats who are to implement these schemes. As for now they do not 
have the right educational background to implement the vision and the more 
concrete initiatives in a professional and correct way. The level of professionalism 
has to be raised considerably if Vision 2020 and MSC should become a reality and 
not only a national political rhetorically construction. Like several other informants, 
the representative from Pentamaster did not have high thoughts about the general 
abilities of the bureaucracy when discussing actual implementation and 
functionality. 
 
In relation to 2020 and MSC, LKT is not a mainstream company in this connection, 
meaning that as a company that mainly works within automation and in the plastic 
industry it is only indirectly related to these visions, as the latter mainly concentrate 
on high-tech companies. Generally speaking, LKT has problems with these political 
ideological initiatives, as they encroach on LKT in terms of labour power! According 
to LKT Vision 2020 and MSC had hit it hard in terms of employment, as they 
snatch away the best graduates thus increasing the transaction cost for LKT, as it 
has to recruit qualified labours from abroad. Those labours lured away from, say, 
LKT ends up in the call-centres that are sat up in Cybercity on mainland Malaysia. 
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I think it is important to point towards a lack of sensitivity on behalf of the federal 
developmental state, when introducing new directions for how Malaysia should 
develop. Vision 2020 and especially MSC is a case in point. Vision 2020 is in a 
sense harmless as it does not have direct impact on the industrial setup in Penang 
nor does it have a major impact on the political realm, as the latter is far more 
pragmatic oriented. MSC, on the other hand, have had a direct impact on state 
economic policies, as it highlights certain sectors within the industrial set up thus 
neglecting other ones. This means that the latter ones, and here we are talking 
about SMEs and PLCs that are not engaged in the high-tech sector, find it more 
difficult to attract support from the various governmental initiated economic 
facilitators, as they are, so to speak, out of focus. 
 
If we focus in particular on the Chinese SME community then the impact of SMC 
will really make a difference, as it will favour those SMEs that work in the high-tech 
sector. Those SMEs that do not work in this field but concentrate on service and 
trade instead will definitely be left out of the loop in this connection. This means 
that they will not have access to financial means and developmental schemes in 
terms of upgrading their technological base as well as their management systems. 
The perhaps most important problem facing both the Chinese SME community as 
well as a further development of PLCs are, however, not the advancement of 
technological development but the quality and educational level of the labour force. 
Actually, this is the Achilles‘ heel behind the attempt by Penang’s industrial 
establishment to move up the national as well as international value chain. For 
example, a representative from SERI suggested more focus on bio-technology as 
a way forward for Penang, but a senior state adviser shot it down by saying that 
before one initiate such initiatives one have to have the right kind of labour power. 
Currently Penang cannot offer this kind of employees to pertinent companies. As 
previously mentioned, PSDC did its best to upgrade the current labour force and 
management practices but it has so far not been enough. Universiti Sains Malaysia 
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and the tertiary sector in general are likewise not capable of supplying the industry 
with qualified employees. As for now, the best students leave these institutions for 
the better universities and companies abroad, thereby reinforcing a downward 
negative spiral in term of producing a higher qualified workforce. 
 
Conclusion 
The main conclusions of this article are thus two-fold: first, the various fault-lines 
within the SME community and the relationships between it, the PLCs and the 
MNCs have to be addressed so as to create more synergy between the three of 
them. This is essential for initiating a more holistic industrial development in 
Penang. Second, the question of qualified labour power is a crucial one, as this is a 
sine qua non for Penang’s industrial establishment to change its current state as a 
low level manufacturing site and move towards a more R&D dominated industrial 
complex. Finally, it is not enough to focus on the PLCs and the MNCs and their 
respective needs. The SME sector is of crucial importance here, as it first of all 
constitutes about 80% of the industrial setup, and second, it constitutes an 
important service sector and a pool of more or less specialised suppliers for the 
PLCs and MNCs. Upgrading the SMEs in terms of technological know-how as well 
as management skills is highly important if the whole industrial setup is to be lifted 
further up the value chain. 
 
Furthermore, this article has also tried to show that the Chinese owned SMEs in 
the high-tech sector do not constitute a homogeneous entity thus indicating that it 
is not notions of Chineseness that binds this group together. On the contrary, the 
diversification among these firms points towards other forces which introduces 
different economic fault-lines between the various sections within the SME 
community. The major fault-lines were identified as consisting of, first, those which 
divided the SME community into those that catered for the global market and those 
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that were mainly directed towards the domestic market, and second, those SMEs 
that were working within the high-tech sector and those working in the trade and 
service sectors. A more subtle fault-line that is indirectly conditioned by the 
previous two ones was a change in which the Chinese owned SMEs were 
managed in terms of technological and managerial practices. This depended on 
where on a developmental continuum a SME could be identified. The smaller the 
more traditionally oriented the SMEs were managed, and the higher up the value 
chain a SME could be identified a more arms-length structure of management 
practices began to emerge. Arguably, the forces that lay behind these developing 
fault-lines shows that intra-ethnic relation are not the driving forces behind the 
diversification of the Chinese SME business community, but rather an encroaching 
global market economy that pushes though changes within the individual firm thus 
producing the above mentioned fault-lines in the process. 
 
These developments thus highlight a situation in which external forces in relation to 
a given market create inter- and intra-ethnic diversification and not vice versa. For 
example, what make the Chinese in Penang Chinese is not based on those 
definitions that some academic and economic conventions on Chinese 
entrepreneurship in Malaysia, or for that matter in Southeast Asia in general, are 
based on, namely intra-ethnic relation.24
                                                 
24 Bolt (2000), Gesteland (2005), Redding (1993), Weidenbaum and Hughes (1996). 
 Instead we are talking about political 
engineered notions of ethnicity so as to maintain a given macro-political inter-
ethnical triangulation which maintains the Malays as the dominant ethnic group. 
We thus have a situation in which, on the one hand, engagement in the global 
market economy produces inter-ethnic co-opetition, and on the other hand a 
nationally political engineered notion of inter-ethnic relation co-exists. Inter- and 
intra-ethnic relations are thus pushed from a back-stage to a front-stage scenario 
and vice versa depending on where one wants to put ones perspective as an 
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observer. As stated in the very beginning of this article notion of identity and thus 
ethnic belonging are not something given but created and constructed. 
 
Interestingly, the bumiputra system has never posed a constraint to Chinese 
entrepreneurs. It however has significant impact on the limits to growth of Chinese 
enterprises. The entrepreneurial spirit of the Chinese and other ethnic groups has 
been and will continue to be thriving. This is evident from the increasing number of 
Chinese owned petty traders and hawkers, small over medium to big business 
units currently operating in Penang. Indeed, the pro-bumiputra policies have 
deprived the other ethnic youths of job opportunities in the government sector as 
well as entry into the public tertiary institutions even though they are qualified. 
However, these "drop-outs" have an enterprising drive that is motivated exactly 
because of the bumiputra policy thus making them fend for themselves by either 
studying or seeking jobs overseas or by venturing into private business. These 
kinds of challenges were interpreted by representatives from the Chinese Chamber 
of Commerce as an inherent aspect of Chinese entrepreneurship, namely 
openness towards change. As has been discussed in this article it is not possible 
to make a distinction between the past and the future of Chinese entrepreneurship. 
In Penang the two will always be conflated in the present. 
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